Why P5+1 Mechanism Is Not Efficient Enough to Achieve Broad-based Agreement?

Ali Ghannadi
After several rounds of negotiations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the P5+1 group, it is now clear that Iran “may need other mechanisms different from the P5+1 to overcome the problem because the P5+1 mechanism is not efficient enough to make way for the achievement of a broad-based agreement” between the negotiating parties ./


Almaty 2 talks were somehow different from past rounds of talks between Iran and the P5+1 group and although no new grounds were broken in terms of substance, both Iran and the US and EU have announced that the negotiations will go on.
Following negotiations with Iran, Catherine Ashton, the European Union’s foreign policy chief who also leads the P5+1 group’s negotiating team, said that the two sides remained “far apart on the substance” of the talks, adding, “For the first time that I’ve seen, [there was] a real back and forth between us, where we are able to discuss details, to pose questions, and to get answers directly.” Meanwhile, the US Secretary of State John Kerry, who was in Turkey’s capital city of Ankara on Sunday, April 7, warned Iran that negotiations cannot go on for an unlimited period of time. He, however, emphasized that Obama administration believes that negotiations should continue. Also, a senior US official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told reporters on the sidelines of the negotiations that what happened in Almaty 2 was true negotiation. The same official added, “Among the interchanges described, was a 30-45 minute back and forth between the lead US negotiator at the talks, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman, and Iran’s lead negotiator, Saeed Jalili, in which Sherman asked Jalili a series of specific questions and he responded.”
Both sides have clearly confirmed that no new ground has been broken in Almaty 2, but serious nature of negotiations has convinced all the involved parties to go on with the negotiations. Of course, no date and venue has been determined for the next round of talks.
What is main cause of difference?
Iran insists that there should be a clear-cut framework for the negotiations, so that, the process would have a beginning, a middle stage, and an ending. In this way, Iran argues, everybody would know what concession(s) each side should give in every step of the way and what they should expect in return. This process will probably end in the total lifting of the West’s sanctions against Iran, recognition of Iran's right to enrich uranium, and giving of firm guarantees by Iran about lack of any deviation in its nuclear energy program toward a nuclear weapons program. The West has neither rejected, nor accepted this, but argues that at first, small steps should be taken to build confidence between the two sides. For example, they propose voluntary suspension of enrichment by Iran in return for the abrogation of certain parts of anti-Iran sanctions.
Tehran accepts the need for taking small, confidence-building steps, but notes that such steps should be “equivalent” in weight on both sides, concluding that “suspension [of uranium enrichment] in return for lifting of a small part of sanctions are not equivalent in weight.” The Western side, however, emphasizes that part of its existing demands are also among its “immediate concerns” which it cannot easily ignore.
Although this collection of differences caused Almaty 2 negotiations to end without a conclusive result, they also prompted both sides to engage in more transparent and more serious discussions than ever before, thus, shedding more light on the points of difference as well as their policy lines. This is why Ms. Ashton told reporters that the two sides were “far apart on the substance” of the negotiations though they “agreed that all sides will go back to capitals to evaluate where we stand in the process.” An unnamed senior American official close to the negotiating parties also told reporters that “there may not have been a breakthrough [in Almaty 2 talks], but there was also not a breakdown.”
Despite all pessimism…
Despite all the pessimism which surrounds the possibility of finding a solution to the strategic nuclear standoff between Iran and the West, negotiations in Almaty clearly proved that there is no reason to stop the diplomatic process. Stopping this process will not only deprive both sides of the low-cost means of “diplomacy” and lead to further escalation of suspicions on both sides, but will also gradually usher the negotiating parties toward more security-based resolutions, which would be much costlier than the diplomatic process. Therefore, there is no reason for decision-makers who are closely involved in the negotiations both in Tehran, and the West to waste time over optimistic or pessimistic forecasts about whether negotiations between the two sides will finally achieve a conclusive result or not. The main focus should be on achieving a result. In this way, both parties to the negotiations will be able to avoid choosing more dangerous options.
Despite all odds, negotiations in Almaty proved that the United States and Europe, especially the United States, are faced with serious limitations for the achievement of a strategic solution to Iran's nuclear issue. This issue may have a number of reasons. One of those reasons is that the overall decision-making structure (at least) in the United States is too complicated to allow Obama administration to easily enter into any form of long-term processes, including one which would end in total abrogation of sanctions which have been imposed on Iran. This problem is so serious that some unofficial proposals offered to Iran only focused on the issue of lifting the European Union’s sanctions – not those of the United States. The details of this issue cannot be discussed here.
A misunderstanding as big as the distance from Tehran to Europe and US
Almaty 2 negotiations also showed that there are still serious misunderstandings between the two sides. Some observers who followed Almaty 2 talks have noted that Iranian, American and European delegations have not been able to communicate with one another in a suitable manner and, in a sort of saying, they did not understand one another. Part of this problem is due to differences in language, but an even more important part is due to differences between political cultures or what can be called the “diplomatic culture.” An American official close to negotiations, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told the Christian Science Monitor, “We do see the world differently…. We come from different cultures, different backgrounds, and different ways of solving problems. And so it takes a lot of time to understand each other and to understand what each other is saying… The devil is truly in the details.”
It seems that when the Iranian side says that it wants to see a firm framework for the negotiations which would have a “beginning,” a “middle process,” and an “ending,” this is not at all comprehensible for the Western parties in negotiations at the current level. Let’s go over the aforesaid American official’s remarks again: “We come from different cultures, different backgrounds, and different ways of solving problems.” Long years of the absence of bilateral contacts between Iran and the United States have apparently widened the gaps between the two sides.
A structure seven years old
Another serious problem which exists in this regard seems to be related to the very structure of the P5+1 group, on the one hand, and to individual negotiators, on the other hand. American sources close to negotiations have noted that Wendy Sherman and Saeed Jalili were engaged in a question and answer session for about 30-45 minutes. Saeed Jalili also confirmed this in an interview with the Christian Science Monitor when he said, “I like to think that we tried our very best to take as many questions as was possible to us…. We took a lot of time, taking those questions, providing responses, explaining our positions, our ideas, in great detail. This was so thorough that finally the members of [the P5+1] were asked, ‘Do you have any remaining questions?’ and nobody had any questions.”
To keep on the safe side and avoid pessimism, one may at least say that the Western negotiating diplomats (including deputy foreign ministers) are bound by limitations for the acceptance of the long-term process that Iran proposes. In simpler terms, while Iranian negotiators went to Almaty to find a long-term solution to the nuclear issue, it seemed that the European and American negotiators were not pursuing a similar goal. Of course, this does not necessarily mean that the Western negotiating teams were low level, but it may have a number of implications at the same time.
Firstly, Iran may need new structures and mechanisms other than the P5+1 mechanism to overcome this problem. Tehran may even need different or parallel bilateral or unilateral mechanisms. Let’s not forget that before the existing framework for negotiations with the P5+1 came into being in 2006, Tehran was engaged in negotiations with the European troika (the UK, France and Germany, which were also known as EU3) for the resolution of its nuclear issue. However, due to exigencies of time, that framework gradually changed and the new framework has been in place for about seven years.
Perhaps it is not absolutely necessary for this framework to change, but working out other bilateral or unilateral frameworks in parallel may be of use to get the negotiations out of the current state of stalemate. It is noteworthy that the nature of the negotiating process may also cause problems.
In her news conference following Almaty negotiations, which unlike previous instances was done in the absence of Saeed Jalili, Ashton stated that the two sides remained “far apart on the substance” of the talks, but added, “For the first time that I’ve seen, [there was] a real back and forth between us, where we are able to discuss details, to pose questions, and to get answers directly.” By saying this, Ashton was apparently referring to the questions and answers which were exchanged between Jalili and Sherman.
All told, it really appears that it will not be possible to take any serious steps through a two-day negotiation process at the existing level and with the current proportions.
Key Words: Iran, P5+1, Different Mechanism, US, Jalili, Sherman, Framework, Negotiations, Confidence-Building Steps, Pessimism, Misunderstanding, Qannadi

Full text of El Baradei report on iran nuclear program

Full text of ElBaradei's Iran report

Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohammed ElBaradei released his report on Iran's peaceful nuclear program, in which he said his agency has been able to verify the "non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran." The full text of his report to the IAEA Board of Governors, a copy of which was made available to IRNA on Thursday, reads as follows:

"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran
"Report by the Director General
"1. On 30 August 2007, the Director General reported to the Board of Governors on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) (GOV/2007/48 and Corr.1). This report covers the relevant
developments since that date.

"A. Impelementation of the Work Plan on Outstanding Issues "2. On 21 August 2007, the Secretariat and Iran reached understandings on a work plan for resolving outstanding safeguards implementation issues (GOV/2007/48, Attachment). Since the previous report, the following progress has been made in the implementation of the work plan.

"A.1.P-1 and P-2 Centrifuges
"3. The chronology of activities since the previous report is as follows:
"*On 31 August 2007, the Agency provided to Iran in writing the outstanding questions relating to the P-1 uranium enrichment program.

"*On 24 and 25 September 2007, a meeting took place in Tehran between the Agency and Iranian officials to clarify the questions provided to Iran.

"From 9 to 11 October 2007, another meeting took place in Tehran between the Agency and the Iranian authorities, at which Iran provided oral answers to the questions and the Agency requested additional clarifications and amplifications.

"*On 15 October 2007, the Agency received preliminary written answers to the questions;
"*From 20 to 24 October 2007, an Agency technical team visited Tehran to review in detail the answers and supporting documentation and to interview officials involved in the P-1 and P-2 uranium enrichment programme.

"*From 29 October to 1 November 2007, the Agency continued discussions with the Iranian authorities on the centrifuge enrichment programme. Iran provided additional supporting
documentation and written amplifications and the Agency held disucssions and interviews with Iranian officials involved in nuclear activities in the 1980s and 1990s;
"*On 5 and 12 November 2007, Iran provided in writing its responses to the Agency's questions about the P-1 and P-2 uranium enrichment programme.

"A.1.1. Acquisition of Fuel Cycle Faciltiies and Technology 1972- 1995
"4. According to Iran, in its early years, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) concluded a number of contracts with entities from France, Germany, the United Kigndom and the United States of America to enable it to acquire nuclear power and a wide range of related nuclear fuel cycle services, but after the 1979 revolution, these contracts with a total value of around $10 billion were not fulfilled. Iran noted that one of the contracts, signed in 1976, was for the development of a pilot plant for laser enrichment.

(In addition to the 1976 contract for the laser enrichment pilot plant, concluded with a US company, Iran has reported the conclusion of the following contracts related to laser enrichment (GOV/2004/ 60. Annex. Para 30): *1975 - for the establishment of a laboratory to study the spectroscopic behavior of uranium metal (Germany);
*1991 - for the establishment of a laser spectroscopy Laboratory and Comprehensive Separation Laboratory (China); *1998 - to obtain information related to laser enrichment and the supply of relevant equipment (Russian Federation).) Senior Iranian officials said that, in the mid-1980s, Iran started working with advantage of investments already made, Iran said it focused its efforts initially on the completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, working with entities from, inter alia, Argentina, France, Germany and Spain, but without success. At that time, Iran also initiated efforts to acquire research reactors from Argentina, China, India and the former Soviet Union, but also without success.

"5. Parallel to the activities related to nuclear power plants, Iran started to build supporting infrastructure by establishing nuclear technology centres in Esfahan and Karaj. However, apart from uranium conversion technology acquired from an entity in China, Iran was not able to acquire other nuclear fuel cycle facilities or technology from abroad. As a result, according to Iran, a decision was made in the mid-1980s to acquire uranium enrichment technology on the black market.

"6. To assess the detailed information provided by Iran, the Agency held discussions with senior current and former Iranian officials. The Agency also examined supporting documentation, including Iranian legislation, contracts with foreign companies, agreements with other States and nuclear site surveys.

"7.Bearing in mind the long history and complexity of the programme and the dual nature of enrichment technology, the Agency is not in a position, based on the information currently available to it, to draw conclusions about the original underlying nature of parts of the Programme. Further light may be shed on this question when other aspects of the work plan have been addressed and when the Agency has been able to verify the completeness of Iran's
declarations.

"A.1.2. Acquisiition of P-1 Centrifuge Technology
"The 1987 Offer
"8. As previously reported to the Board (GOV/2005/67, paras 14-15), the Agency was shown by Iran in January 2005 a copy of a hand-written one-page document reflecting an offer for certain components and equipment said to have been made to Iran in 1987 by a foreign intermediary. Iran stated in 2005 that this was the only remaining documentary evidence relevant to the scope and content of the 1987 offer. On 9 October 2007, the Agency was provided with a copy of the document. Certain aspects of the document indicate that it dates from 1987. However, the originator of the document has still not been identified.

"9. On 5 November 2007, Iran provided the Agency with an updated chronology of meetings between Iran and the supply network covering the period 1986 to 1987. Iran maintains that only some components of two disassembled centrifuges, plus supporting drawings and specifications, were delivered in 1987 by the network. Iran reiterated that it did not acquire uranium casting and
re-conversion technology or equipment from the network, nor did it ask for the 15-page document describing the procedures for the reduction of UF6 to uranium metal, and its casting into hemispheres (GOV/2005/87, para. 6). These points are addressed in A.3 below.

"10. According to Iran, the decision to acquire centrifuge technology was taken by the President of the AEOI and endorsed by the Prime Minister of Iran. In response to its enquiries about possible additinal documentation relevant to the 1987 offer, the Agency was provided on 8 November 2007 with a copy of a confidential communication from the President of the AEOI to the Prime Minister, dated 28 February 1987, which also carried the Prime Minister's endorsement, dated 5 March 1987. In his communication, the AEOI President indicated that the activities "should be treated fully confidentially." In response to the Agency's enquiry as to whether there was any military involvement in the programme, Iran has stated that no institution other than the AEOI was involved in the decision- making process or in the implementation of the centrifuge enrichment programme.

"11. Based on interviews with available Iranian officials and members of the supply network, limited documentation provided by Iran and procurement information collected through the Agency's independent investigations, the Agency has concluded that Iran's statements are consistent with other information available to the Agency concerning Iran's acquisition of declared P-1 centrifuge enrichment technology in 1987.
"Early Research and Development "12. Iran has stated that, during the first phase of P-1 research and development (R&D) in 1987-1993, it devoted only limited financial and human resources (three researchers) to the project.


According to Iran, emphasis was put on understanding the behavior of centrifuges and their assembly and on domestic production of components. Iran has also stated that during this period, the R&D work was conducted only by the AEOI, without the support of universities or the Physics Research Centre (PHRC). According to Iran, no contracts were made during this period with the supply network to seek support in solving technical problems which Iran had encountered.

"13. Iran's statements about this phase of R&D are not inconsistent with the Agency's findings, which are based on interviews with available Iranian officials and members of the supply network, supporting documentation provided by Iran and procurement information collected during the Agency's investigations.

However, the role of the technical university at which uranium particle contamination was found still needs to be examined (see A.2 below).

"The 1993 Offer and Subsequent R&D
"14. As previously reported to the Board (GOV/2006/15, para. 15) statement made by Iran and key members of the supply network about the events leading up to the mid-1990s offer have been at variance with each other. Over the course of meetings held in October 2007, Iran provided the Agency with an updated chronology of events from 1993 to 1999 which clarified certain details concerning meetings, participants and deliveries of P-1 centrifuge equipment by the network during this period.

"15. Iran stated again that in 1993 the supply network, on its own initiative, had approached an Iranian company with an offer to sell enrichment technology. This offer was brought to the attention of the Head of Iran's Budget and Planning Organization, who was also a member of the country's Atomic Energy Council. The offer was then further pursued by the AEOI (GOV/2005/67, para. 16).

"16. The Agency has so far not been able to confirm Iran's statement that the supply network initiated the 1993 offer.

Information provided by Iran on the deliveries and technical eetings after 1993 is consistent with that given to the Agency in interviews with some of the network members. Based on interviews with Libyan officials and supply network members and information from other sources, the Agency has concluded that most of the items related to the 1993 offer had originally been ordered by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya but were in fact delivered to Iran in the period 1994-1996
"17.Iran stated that, during the period 1993 to 1999, it was still experiencing difficulty in producing components for P-1 centrifuges and manufacturing reliable P-1 centrifuges. It said that only limited human resources were devoted to the project until 1997 and that, around 1998, additional theoretical and experimental studies were initiated at the Amir Kabir University. Its statements in this regard are supported by the technical questions raised by AEOI staff with the network and procurement information available to the Agency.


"18. Iran stated that it successfully tested P-1 centrifuges at the end of the 1990s and that a decision was made to go ahead with larger- scale R&D and eventually with an enrichment plant. To that end, Iran stated that it considered locations at Hashtgerd Karaj, Natanz and Esfahan before deciding to build the enrichment plant at Natanz.

During this period, procurement activities were intensified and vacuum equipment, as well as special raw materials such as maraging steel and high strength aluminum, were acquired from abroad. Iran has provided names, locations and activities of the workshops involved in the domestic production of centrifuge components, most of which are owned by military industrial organizations (GOV/2004/11, para. 37).

Information provided by Iran on the timing of these purchases and the quantities involved is consistent with the Agency's findings.

"A.1.3. Acquisition of P-2 Centrifuge Technology
"19. Iran has stated that, in order to compensate it for the poor quality of the P-1 centrifuge components provided by the supply network, the network provided Iran at a meeting in Dubai in 1996 with a full set of general P-2 centrifuge drawings. This statement was confirmed to the Agency in interviews with key members of the network.

"20. Iran has reiterated that, although the drawings were acquired in 1996, no work on P-2 centrifuges was begun until 2002. According to the former and current senior management of the AEOI, Iran did not yet have the technical and scientific capabilities to master centrifuge manufacturing during this period. The Agency does not have credible procurement related information pointing to the actual acquisition by Iran of P-2 centrifuges or components during this period (an earlier indication which appeared to support this (GOV/2006/15, para. 18) could not be substantiated).

"21.In 2002, the AEOI concluded a contract with a private company to manufacture a modified P-2 centrifuge (GOV/2004/11, para. 45). On 5 November 2007, the Agency received a copy of the contract, the content of which is consistent with earlier interviews with the company owner' who was not available for interview on this occasion. The contract was terminated in March 2003, but the company owner has stated that he continued to work "on his own initiative" until June 2003.

"22. The owner of the company stated in earlier interviews that he was able to obtain all raw materials and minor items, with the exception of bearings, oil sand magnets, from domestic sources, which is consistent with the procurement information currently available to the Agency. The owner stated that he acquired 150 magnets with P-2 specifications and attempted to buy tens of thousands more, but these orders were cancelled by the suppliers. The AEOI stated that, after termination of his contract with the AEOI, the company owner sought to secure the supply of additional magnets for the AEOI but that his attempts to do so failed, which is consistent with the information available to the Agency through its investigations. Iran acknowledged that composite rotors for P-2 centrifuges had been manufactured in a workshop situated on a Defense Industries Organization (DIO) site (GOV/2004/34, para. 22).

"23. Based on visits made by Agency inspectors to the P-2 workshop in 2004, examination of the company owner's contract, progress reports and logbooks, and information available on procurement enquiries, the Agency has concluded that Iran's statements on the content of the declared P-2 R&D activities are consistent with the Agency's findings.

Environmental samples taken at declared R&D locations and from equipment did not indicate that nuclear material was used in this experiments.

"A.2. Source of Contamination
"24. On 15 September 2007, the Agency provided Iran with questions in writing in connection with the source of uranium particle
contamination at the technical university and requested access to relevant documentation and to individuals, as well as to relevant equipment and locations for sample-taking. The questions were, inter alia, about the origin of the uranium particle contamination of equipment (GOV/2006/53, para. 24), the nature of the equipment, the envisioned use of the equipment and the names and roles of individuals and entities involved (including PHRC). In accordance with the work plan, Iran should provide answers to the questions and the requested access in the next few weeks.
"A.3. Uranium Metal Document "25. On 8 November 2007, the Agency received a copy of the 15-page document describing the procedures for the reduction of UF6 to uranium metal and casting it into hemispheres. Iran has reiterated that this document was received along with the P-1 centrifuge documentation in 1987. The Agency has shared this documentation with Pakistan, the purported country of origin, and is seeking more information. Iran stated the re-conversion unit with casting equipment mentioned in the one-page 1987 offer was not pursued with the supply network. Apart from the conversion experiments of UF4 to uranium metal at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (GOV/2004/60 Annex, para. 2), the Agency has seen no indication of any UF6 re-conversion and casting activity in Iran. It should be noted, however, that a small UF6 to uranium metal conversion line in the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) was declared by Iran in the design information questionnaire for the UCF (GOV /2003/75, Annex 1, para. 3). This line has not been built, as verified by the Agency's inspectors.


"A.4. Polonium-210
"26. On 15 September 2007, the Agency provided questions in writing to Iran concerning Iran's activities involving polonium and requested access to relevant documentation, individuals and equipment. The questions were, inter alia, about the scope and objectives of the polonium-210 studies (GOV/2004/11, para. 28), whether any bismuth acquisition form abroad had been made or attempted and whether any related theoretical or R&D studies had been carried out in Iran. In accordance with the work plan, Iran should provide answers to the questions and the requested access in the next few weeks.

"A.5. Gchine Mine
"27. On 15 September 2007, the Agency provided questions in writing to Iran concerning the Gchine Mine and requested access to relevant documentation, individuals and equipment. The questions were, inter alia, about the ownership of the mining area and mill, why activities took place at this location when suitable infrastructure was available elsewhere and why AEOI activities at the mine ceased around 1993 (GOV /2005/67, para. 26). In accordance with the work plan, Iran should provide answers to the questions and the requested access in the next few weeks.

"A.6. Alleged Studies
"28. The Agency has urged Iran to address at an early date the alleged studies concerning the conversion of uranium dioxide into UF4 (the green salt project), high explosive testing and the design of a missile re-entry vehicle (GOV /2006/15, paras 38-39). In accordance with the work plan, Iran should address this topic in the next weeks.

In the meantime, the Agency is working on arrangements for sharing with Iran documents provided by third parties related to the alleged studies.

"A.7. Facility Attachment for the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant "29.On 17 and 18 September 2007, an Agency technical team discussed with the Iranian authorities details of a draft Facility Attachment for the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz. Further discussions from 20 to 24 September led to the entry into force of the Facility Attachment on 30 September 2007.

"B. Current Enrichment Related Activities
"30. On 3 November 2007, the Agency verified that Iran had finished installing eighteen 164-machine cascades at FEP and that UF6 had been fed into all 18 cascades. There has been no installation of centrifuges pipework outside the original 18-cascade area. Work to install feed and withdrawal infrastructure and auxiliary systems is continuing.

"31. Since February 2007, Iran has fed approximately 1240 kg of UF6 into the cascades at FEP. The feed rate has remained below the expected quantity for a facility of this design. While Iran has stated that it has reached enrichment levels up to 4.8% U-235 at FEP, the highest U-235 enrichment measured so far from the environmental samples taken by the Agency form cascade components and related equipment is 4.0%. Detailed nuclear material accountancy will be carried out during the annual physical inventory taking which is scheduled from 16 to 19 December 2007. Since March 2007, a total of seven unannounced inspections have been carried out at FEP.

"32. Since August 2007, Iran has continued to test single centrifuge machines, the 10- and 20-machine cascades and one 164-machine cascade at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP). Between 23 July and 22 October 2007, Iran fed 5 kg of UF6 into the single machines; no nuclear material was fed into the cascades. From 15 to 18 September 2007, the Agency performed a physical inventory verification at PFEP.

Although some of the sample results are not yet available, the Agency's provisional evaluation tends to confirm the physical inventory as declared by Iran.
"33. There have been several press reports about statements by high level Iranian officials continuing R&D and testing of P2 centrifuges by Iran (GOV/2006/27, para. 14). In a communication to the Agency received on 8 November 2007, Iran wrote: 'Iran voluntarily has informed the IAEA on the status of mechanical test (without UF6 feeding) of new generation of centrifuge design.' In the communication Iran added that it 'agreed that exchanging of the new centrifuge generation information' would be discussed with the Agency in December 2007.


"C. Reprocessing Activities
"34. the Agency has continued monitoring the use and construction of hot cells at Tehran research reactor (TRR), the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope production facility ( the MIX facility) and the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) through inspections and design information verification, there have been no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at those facilities.

"D. Heavy Water Reactor Related Projects
"35. On 11 November 2007, the Agency conducted design information verification at the IR-40 and noted that construction of the facility was proceeding. Satellite imaginary appears to indicate that Heavy Water Production Plant is operating. The Agency must rely on satellite imaginary of the plants as it does not have routine access to it while the Additional Protocol remains unimplemented.

"E. Other Implementation Issues
"E.1. Uranium Conversion
"36. During the current conversion campaign at UCF which began on 31 March 2007, approximately 78 tonnes of Uranium in the form of UF6 had been produced as of November 2007. This brings the total amount of UF6 produced at UCF since March 2004 to approximately 266 tonnes, all of which remain under Agency containment and surveillance.

"E.2. Design Information
"37. On 30 March 2007, the Agency requested Iran to reconsider its decision to suspend the implementation of the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1.(GOV/2007/22. paras 12- 14) (Code 3.1 of the subsidiary Arrangements General Part as agreed to in 1976 provides for the submission of design information for new facilities "normally not later than 180 days before the facility is scheduled to receive nuclear material for the first time", in contrast to the modified text agreed to in 2003, which provides for the submission of such information as soon as the decision to construct, or authorized construction, of such a facility has been taken, (whichever is earlier.), but there has been no progress on this issue.

"E.3. other matters
"38. The Agency has made arrangement to verify and seal the fresh fuel foreseen for the Bushehr nuclear power plant on 26 November 2007, before shipment of the fuel from Russian Federation to Iran.

"F. Summary
"39. the Agency has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran has provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material, and has provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and activities. Iran concluded Facility Attachment for FEP.

However, it should be noted that, since early 2006, the Agency has not received the type of information that Iran had previously been providing, pursuant to the Additional Protocol and as a transparency measure. As a result, the agency's knowledge about Iran's current nuclear program is diminishing.

"40. Contrary to the decision of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities, having continued the operation of PFEP and FEP. Iran has also continued the construction of the IR-40 and operation of the Heavy Water Production Plant.

"41. There are two remaining major issues relevant to the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear program: Iran's past and current centrifuge enrichment program and the alleged studies. The Agency has been able to conclude that answers provided on the declared past P-1 and P-2 centrifuge program are consistent with its findings. The Agency will, however, continue to seek corroboration and is continuing to verify the completeness of Iran's declaration. The Agency intends in the next few weeks to focus on the contamination issue as well as the alleged studies and other activities that could have military applications.

42. Iran has provided sufficient access to the individuals and has responded in a timely manner to questions and provided clarifications and amplifications on issues raised in the content of the work plan.

However, its cooperation has been reactive rather than proactive. As previously started, Iran's active cooperation and full transparency are indispensable for full and prompt implementation of the work plan.

"43. In addition, Iran needs to continue to build confidence about the scope and nature of its present program. Confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program requires that the Agency be able to provide assurances not only regarding declared nuclear material, but, equally importantly, regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. Although the Agency has no concrete information, other than that addressed through the work plan, about possible current undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran without full implementation of the Additional Protocol. This is especially important in the light of Iran's undeclared activities for almost two decades and the need to restore confidence in exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program.

Therefore, the Director General again urges Iran to implement all the confidence-building measures required by the Security Council, including the suspension of all enrichment related activities.

"44. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate." 1420**1771

Yang in Iran to discuss nuke issue

Yang in Iran to discuss nuke is
2007-11-13 07


Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi and his Iranian counterpart Manouchehr Mottaki today will discuss Teheran's nuclear program and other issues of common concern today, Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao said Monday.


China's Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi is seen addressing the 62nd United Nations General Assembly in New York in this September 28, 2007 file photo. [Agencies]

The nuclear issue will definitely be on top of the agenda during Yang's visit to Iran. But that is not the sole purpose of his trip, Hua Liming, former Chinese ambassador to Iran, told China Daily.

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a country with close ties with Iran, China will try to persuade Iran to cooperate with the international community, Hua said.

The European Union foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, and Saeed Jalili, who replaced Ali Larijani as Iran's chief nuclear negotiator last month, agreed on Sunday to hold a new round of talks by the end of this month, Iranian news agencies have said.

But after Larijiani was replaced, the talks have created more doubts than they have raised hopes. The change of guard doesn't bode well for a resolution of Iran's nuclear issue, Hua said, because Larijani was known for being practical and cooperative with the West.

The acceptance of Larijani's resignation itself means that the Iranian government will probably walk away from his soft line, Hua said.

But differences exist not only within the Iranian government, but also in the White House, with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice considering sanctions as a solution and Vice-President Dick Cheney advocating a war strategy.

"Since Teheran refused to budge despite threats of more sanctions, and as Russia, some European countries and China cannot see where such sanctions could lead, the Bush administration is facing increasing pressure from war campaigners such as Cheney," Hua said.
By Qiang Pen (China Daily)

Yang in Iran to discuss nuke issue

Iran president threatens to expose nuclear 'traitors'

irannuk — President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on Monday threatened to expose "traitors" who were pressuring his government over its atomic ambitions in the face of mounting calls on Iran to stop controversial nuclear work.

"If the internal elements do not stop pressures over the nuclear issue they will be exposed to the Iranian people," the state news agency IRNA quoted Ahmadinejad as saying at a Tehran university.

"These are traitors and, in accordance with the vows we have taken to the nation, we will not back down and be onlookers," he told students at the Elm-o-Sanat (Science and Industry) university.

Moderates inside Iran have attacked Ahmadinejad for his handling of Iran's nuclear programme, with former presidents Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami warning against the "serious threats" facing the country.

According to the Fars news agency, Ahmadinejad said his government was under pressure from people who cited "the possibility of an attack and war" on Iran to stop its nuclear programme which the West suspects is cover for a weapons drive.

Without naming any individuals, Ahmadinejad said these people "met with foreigners every week and told the enemies why they were backing down and postponing (UN) resolutions."

Iran is under two sets of UN Security Council sanctions for its refusal to suspend uranium enrichment, the process which makes nuclear fuel and, in highly extended form, the fissile core of an atomic bomb.

Tehran denies Western suspicions, insisting that its nuclear programme is aimed solely at generating electricity for a growing population once fossil fuels run out.

Ahmadinejad has defiantly vowed to press on with the nuclear activities and ignore UN resolutions, despite the possibility of further punitive measures.

Washington, which accuses Tehran of seeking atomic weapons, has never ruled out military action against Iran over its nuclear programme, although the White House insists it wants to resolve the crisis through diplomacy.

In recent weeks, a number of Iranian politicians, both reformist and conservative, have warned of the reality of the threats against Iran despite efforts by Ahmadinejad to brush off the idea of a US attack.

Ahmadinejad also accused his critics of intervening of behalf of a suspected spy.

"Right now they have pressured the judge in a case to acquit a spy. The Iranian nation will not allow a minority to save the offenders from people's vengeance by using their political and economic influence," he said.

Ahmadinejad's attack appeared to be aimed at former nuclear negotiator Hossein Moussavian who was briefly detained in May on national security-related accusations.

Moussavian, who is a close ally of Rafsanjani, was accused of leaking information to a foreign embassy. He was released on bail but the case is not closed.

"We are tolerating them due to some sensitivities but, when the nuclear question ends, we will express all issues in a student circle," Ahmadinejad said, speaking at the university where he used to study and teach before becoming president.

Moussavian is now the deputy head of a research institute led by Hassan Rowhani, who was Iran's top nuclear negotiator under Ahmadinejad's reformist predecessor Khatami.

The research institute operates under the auspices of the Expediency Council, Iran's top political arbitration body headed by Rafsanjani, who was roundly defeated by Ahmadinejad in the 2005 presidential election.(afp)

Iran says determined to make atomic fuel at home

Thu Jul 20, 2006 5:55 AM ET



"nuclear iran"- Iran said on Thursday it was determined to produce nuclear fuel on its territory in defiance of international calls to halt the work and accused the United States of trying to prevent a negotiated solution to its dispute with the West.

"Based on law, Iran has planned to produce 20,000 MW of nuclear electricity in the next 20 years and needs to produce nuclear fuel inside the country for those reactors," chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani said in a statement, read out on state television.

He said Iran was still reviewing nuclear proposals backed by six nations and wanted talks to solve the dispute. But said the United States "has been trying to create obstacles in the way of talks and a diplomatic solution to this issue".
source:reuters
posted by ali ghannadi -irannuk

Iran says it will deliver response Aug. 22

July 20, 2006, 7:58AM



By ALI AKBAR DAREINI Associated Press Writer


"nuclear iran"-— Iran said Thursday it would formally respond on Aug. 22 to a Western package of incentives aimed at resolving the standoff over its suspect nuclear program _ the first time the Islamic republic has set a specific date for its reply.

The Supreme National Security Council, Iran's top security decision-making body, also threatened that the country would reconsider its nuclear policies if sanctions were imposed by the United Nations.

The council did not elaborate, but Iranian officials repeatedly have suggested that Tehran may withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and stop cooperating with U.N. inspectors.

"The package of incentives requires a logical time to study it ... Aug. 22 has been set for declaring (our) views," the council said in a statement read on state-run television.

"In case the path of confrontation is chosen instead of the path of dialogue ... and Iran's definite rights are threatened, then there will be no option for Iran but to reconsider its nuclear policies."

The statement came a day after Russia said the U.N. Security Council is in no rush to pressure Iran over its nuclear program, striking a more conciliatory tone than the United States as diplomats began discussing a resolution to put legal muscle behind demands that Tehran suspend uranium enrichment.

The United States and some of its allies accuse Iran of seeking to produce highly enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons. Tehran says its nuclear program is peaceful and aimed at generating electricity.

In Thursday's statement, Iran said it plans to generate 20,000 megawatts of electricity through nuclear energy in the next 20 years.

The Western nations on June 6 offered Iran a package of incentives _ including advanced technology and possibly even nuclear research reactors _ if Tehran suspended enrichment.

But the frustrated powers agreed last week to send Iran back to the U.N. Security Council for possible punishment, saying Tehran had given no sign it would bargain in earnest over its nuclear ambitions.

Iran has said the incentives package was an "acceptable basis" for negotiations.

Hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad initially said Iran would respond to the package in mid-August, but the republic then pushed back its response to late August. Thursday's statement was the first time a specific date was set.

The United States has accused Iran of stalling while it continues to pursue suspect technology, but Tehran accused Washington on Thursday of putting up "obstacles."

The Iranian council said special committees in key state agencies were still studying the offer by the United States, Britain, China, France, Russia and Germany, and it invited the United States and its allies to return to the negotiating table.

It said it was "surprising" that the United States was creating obstacles for a negotiated settlement while Iran was seriously studying the offer.

"Iran is not after tension, but if others push things toward tension and create problems, then all will face problems. Iran believes dialogue is the most logical solution. It is serious in this path. We want the other side to return to the negotiating table," the statement said.

"The Islamic Republic of Iran is committed to a negotiated settlement through diplomacy. The United States, by changing the path of talks toward the Security Council, is trying to create obstacles."

A senior Iranian lawmaker said Tuesday the country's parliament was preparing to debate withdrawal from the nonproliferation treaty if the U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution that would force Tehran to suspend uranium enrichment.

Withdrawal from the treaty could end all international oversight of Iran's nuclear program.

In February, Iran for the first time produced its first batch of low-enriched uranium, using a cascade of 164 centrifuges. The process of uranium enrichment can be used to generate electricity or in building a bomb, depending on the level of enrichment.

Iran has said it will never give up its right under the treaty to enrich uranium and produce nuclear fuel, but it has indicated it may temporarily suspend large-scale activities to ease tensions.
© 2006 The Associated Press
posted by ali ghannadi -irannuk

The drums of war sound for Iran

july 21,2006
By Jim Lobe

"nuclear iran"-- The week-old Israeli-Hezbollah conflict is likely to boost the chances of US military action against Iran, according to a number of regional experts who see a broad consensus among the US political elite that the ongoing hostilities are part of a broader offensive being waged by Tehran against Washington across the region.

While Israel-centered neo-conservatives have been the most aggressive in arguing that Hezbollah's July 12 cross-border attack could only have been carried out with Iran's approval, if not encouragement, that view has been largely accepted and echoed by the US mainstream media, as well as other key political



factions, including liberal internationalists identified with the Democratic Party.

"In my reading, this is the beginning of what was a very similar process in the period, between [the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against New York and the Pentagon] and the Iraq war," said Gregory Gause, who teaches Middle East politics at the University of Vermont.

"While neo-cons took the lead in opinion formation then, eventually there was something approaching consensus in the American political class that war with Iraq was a necessary part of remaking the Middle East to prevent future 9/11s," he said.

"That strong majority opinion was bipartisan [and] crossed ideological lines - neo-cons supported the war, but so did lots of prominent liberal intellectuals," he said. "I think it is very possible that a similar consensus could develop over the next few years, if not the next few months, about the necessity to confront Iran."

Indeed, almost as if to prove the point, the US Senate voted unanimously on Tuesday to approve a resolution that not only endorsed Israel's military actions in Gaza and Lebanon without calling on it to exercise any restraint, but also urged US President George W Bush to impose across-the-board diplomatic and economic sanctions on Tehran and Damascus. The House of Representatives was expected to pass a similar resolution on Thursday.

To Gause and other analysts, Tehran, even before the current crisis, offered a tempting target of blame for Washington's many frustrations in the region.

In addition to its long-standing support for Hezbollah, whose political power has, in Washington's view, stalled last year's so-called "Cedar Revolution", Iran has backed both Hamas, including the Damascus-based military wing that last month precipitated the current round of violence by abducting an Israeli soldier outside Gaza, and Shi'ite militias that have helped push Iraq to the brink of a sectarian civil war.

"The world needs to understand what is going on here," wrote the influential liberal New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman last week as Israel launched its military counter-offensive against Hezbollah.

"The little flowers of democracy that were planted in Lebanon, Iraq and the Palestinian territories are being crushed by the boots of Syrian-backed Islamist militias who are desperate to keep real democracy from taking hold in this region and Iranian-backed Islamist militias desperate to keep modernism from taking hold."

But Iran can be blamed for other ills, as well. By allegedly promoting instability throughout the region, as well as fears of an eventual military confrontation with Washington, Iran can also be blamed for the rise of oil prices, from which it is profiting handsomely, to record levels.

And its repeated rejection of US demands that it respond to the pending proposal for a deal on its nuclear program adds to the thesis that Iran is engaged in its own form of asymmetric warfare against Washington. Indeed, it has become accepted wisdom in Washington that Iran encouraged Hezbollah's July 12 raid as a way to divert attention from growing international concern over its nuclear program.

"There has been a lot of connecting of the dots back to Iran," said retired Colonel August Richard Norton, who teaches international relations at Boston University. "This goes well beyond the [neo-conservative] Weekly Standard crowd; we've seen the major newspapers all accept the premise that what happened July 12 was engineered in some way by Iran as a way of undermining efforts to impede its nuclear program."

Graham Fuller, a former top Central Intelligence Agency and RAND Corporation Middle East expert, noted that there has been a "buildup of domestic forces that now see Iran as inexorably at the center of the entire regional spider web".

"The mainstream is unfortunately grasping for coherent explanations, [and] the neo-con/hard right offers a fairly simple, self-serving vision on the cause of the problems, and their solution," Fuller said.

In much the same way that Saddam Hussein was depicted, particularly by neo-conservatives, as the strategic domino whose fall would unleash a process of democratization, de-radicalization, moderation and modernization throughout the Middle East, so now Iran is portrayed as the "Gordian Knot" whose cutting would not only redress many of Washington's recent setbacks, but also renew prospects for regional "transformation" in the way that it was originally intended.

The notion that, as the puppetmaster behind Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas and Shi'ite militias in Iraq, an aggressive and emboldened Iran is the source of Washington's many problems has the added virtue of relieving the policy establishment in Washington of responsibility for the predicament in which the US finds itself or of the necessity for "painful self-examination, or serious policy revision", said Fuller.

"Full speed ahead - no revision of fundamental premises is required. And even though we revel in being the sole global superpower, God forbid that anything the US has done in the region might have at least contributed to the present disaster scene," he said.

As was the case with Iraq, the only dissenters among the policy elite are the foreign-policy "realists", who argue that the Bush administration, in particular, has made a series of disastrous policy errors in the Middle East - especially by providing virtually unconditional support for Israel and invading Iraq.

They also include regional specialists such as Norton, who maintain that the depiction of Hezbollah, for example, as a mere proxy for Iran - let alone the notion that Tehran was behind the July 12 attack - is a dangerous misreading of a much more complex reality.

These forces have been arguing for some time that Washington should engage Iran directly on the full range of issues - from Tehran's nuclear program to regional security - that divide the countries. But the current crisis, and Israel's and the neo-conservatives' success in blaming Iran for it, is likely to make this argument a more difficult sell.

(Inter Press Service)
posted by ali ghannadi-irannuk

Iranian pres. threatens to revise nuclear cooperation with West

11:43 | 13/ 07/ 2006
July 13
"nuclear iran"-- Iran's president said his country could review its nuclear cooperation with the West, Iran's state television said Thursday.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made this statement after France's foreign minister said Wednesday that the six nations working to resolve the crisis around Iran's controversial nuclear program had no option other than to refer Tehran's nuclear file to the UN Security Council.

"Until today, the way we chose was peaceful, within the framework of [IAEA and NPT] regulations," Ahmadinejad said, referring to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN's nuclear watchdog, and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

He added that if the Iranian nation saw that Western countries were insincere in their actions, it would revise its policy in the field of nuclear programs.

Ahmadinejad also said on television that his country would not respond to the Iran 6 proposals before mid-August.

Iran's nuclear program has been a source of major controversy since the beginning of the year, as many countries suspect the Islamic Republic of pursuing a covert weapons program under the pretext of civilian research, despite its claims to the contrary.

EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana presented a package of incentives for Iran, which many countries suspect of pursuing a secret weapons program, in return for its consent to halt uranium enrichment during his visit to the Islamic Republic on June 6. Ahmadinejad earlier said Iran would respond to the Iran-6 proposals by August 22.
Source:ria novosti
posted by ali ghannadi-irannuk

Wrong decision of 5+1 under US influence (News Analysis)

Tehran, July 13


"nuclear iran"--Ministers of foreign affairs of the five UN Security Council veto yielding powers, plus Germany, during the course of a meeting in Paris on Wednesday night, under US influence, agreed to return Iran's nuclear dossier to UNSC once again.

The hurried and hasty decision of the Europeans was declared while the Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, had in his Tuesday meeting with the EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana emphasized that the doors were still open to negotiations, adding that patience was needed for solving the matter through diplomatic channels.

The EU's decision to bounce Iran's nuclear dossier to the UNSC, keeping in mind the previous similar experience, and the tough current conditions that make holding any talks useless, is in fact holding tight to a rope extended by Washington in order to delve into the depths of an abbeys.

The move is meanwhile observing serious double-standards in an effort aimed at demolishing the absolute right of a nation that has on hundreds of occasions emphasized its nuclear program is merely aimed at absolutely peaceful purposes.

The 5+1 foreign ministers's decision on Wednesday was adopted following the poisonous propaganda of the US officials and mass media during the course of the past few days, and would serve no purpose, save for aggravating the atmosphere of mutual mistrust in a context that is in need of full trust for problem solving.

EU must realize the important point that "threats" can only further complicate the process of problem solving, under such conditions that they have felt the humiliation of defeat in confrontation with the strong will of the Iranian nation, and that they are naturally responsible for any further delays in finding a lasting solution to the US-made problem.

Iran has on numerous occasions during the course of the past month considered the 5+1 package as "a positive step forward" and stressed during the recent days that it would present its response to it after the elimination of its ambiguities.

source:irna
posted by ali ghannadi-irannuk

world powers refer Iran to Security Council

July 12, 2006.

"nuclear iran"-- World powers agreed Wednesday to send Iran back to the United Nations Security Council for possible punishment, saying the iran has given no sign it means to negotiate seriously over its disputed nuclear program.

The United States and other permanent members of the powerful U.N. body said Iran has had long enough to say whether it will meet the world's terms to open bargaining that would give Tehran economic and energy incentives in exchange for giving up suspicious activities.

"The Iranians have given no indication at all that they are ready to engage seriously on the substance of our proposals," French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy said on behalf the United States, France, Britain, Russia and China, the five permanent Security Council members, plus Germany and the European Union.

Expressing "profound disappointment," the ministers said, "we have no choice but to return to the United Nations Security Council" and resume a course of possible punishment or coercion that the powers had set aside in hopes of reaching a deal.

Any real punishment or coercion at the Security Council is a long way off, but the group said it will seek an initial resolution requiring Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment. Debate could begin as soon as next week.

If Iran does not comply, the group said it would then seek harsher action. The group's short statement did not give any specifics, but it cited a section of the world body's charter that could open the door to economic or other sanctions.

Though Russia and China signed on to Wednesday's statement, the two traditional commercial partners of Iran have previously stated their opposition to imposing the toughest of sanctions on Tehran.
Russia's foreign minister said Wednesday that any forcible sanctions against Iran were out of the question.

"I would like to emphasize that today the Iran-6 members clearly confirmed the previous statements that rule out any possibility of forcible actions against Iran sanctioned by the UN Security Council," Sergei Lavrov said after a Paris meeting of foreign ministers of the five permanent Security Council members and Germany.

"We are convinced that this [forcible] path would not lead us nowhere other than to another crisis in the region," the minister said. "The only way to resolve the Iranian nuclear problem lies through negotiations."
previous to this development,President Vladimir Putin said Wednesday that Sanctions against Iran could wreck the current positive process in the talks on Iran's controversial nuclear program,

"We are not favor of allowing everybody to buy nuclear weapons or delivery vehicles," Putin said in an interview with Canadian television channel CTV. "We are in favor of finding coordinated decisions together, including within the G8. We will be trying to achieve this."

"But if today, without receiving Iran's response to the proposals made by six countries, we impose some kind of sanctions, we will wreck the positive process that has only just emerged," Putin said.

at same time,Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns, the Bush administration's chief negotiator on the Iran issue, said the United States is pleased by what it called strong action by the Security Council group.

"This is a significant decision that frankly reflects the disappointment and frustration of our countries over the lack of a serious response."

The group said it could stop the Security Council actions at any time should Iran cooperate. The U.N.'s nuclear watchdog agency has already told Iran it must put uranium enrichment and related disputed activities on hold, and doing so is the condition for opening negotiations on the incentives package presented to Iran last month.

If Iran agrees to the group's terms for negotiations, it would mean the first high-level face-to-face talks between the United States and Iran after more than a quarter century of estrangement.

Iran ruled out responding this week to international incentives to suspend disputed portions of its nuclear program. The United States and other nations wanted an answer by Wednesday on whether Iran would meet terms to begin negotiations on a package of economic and energy incentives for Iran in exchange for at least the short-term end to Tehran's rapidly advancing program to enrich uranium.

"The indications are that Iran's response has been disappointing and incomplete," Rice had reporters aboard her flight here.

Iran repeatedly has said it will not respond to the offer before August.

The six countries had been pushing for an agreement before world leaders meet this weekend in Russia for the Group of Eight summit of leading industrial democracies.

Enrichment can produce fuel for a civilian reactor or fissile material for a bomb. The U.S. and its allies suspect Iran's nuclear program is cover for a weapons program, despite Tehran's repeated denials.

"If we go to the Security Council we'll take our time in terms of putting together the best response," to make sure Iran understands that it cannot continue to pursue enrichment while talks are ongoing, and that it also understands it can still choose to bargain, Rice said.

The Security Council would also make clear the consequences of rejecting the deal, Rice said.
source"afp,ria novosti
posted by ali ghannadi-irannuk

US's zero-sum diplomacy toward Iran

By Kaveh L Afrasiabi

"nuclear iran"--On the eve of the Group of Eight (G8) summit in Russia, President George W Bush and his top policymakers openly boast about the US's multilateralist diplomacy toward Iran and, yet, their all-or-nothing approach with respect to Iran's nuclear enrichment program represents a zero-sum pseudo-diplomacy bound to fail.

While pressing Iran to provide a response to the international package prior to the much anticipated summit in St Petersburg, the US government has preemptively rejected the middle-of-the-road option of putting Iran's enrichment program on standby while the talks continue.

In talks in Brussels on Tuesday, the two sides made no headway with Iran, which is still refusing either to accept or reject the offer



of incentives made five weeks ago by six of the world's powers in return for giving up its uranium enrichment program.

In a recent interview with the Arms Control Association, the US envoy to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), George L Schulte, clarified that the US opposes the idea of Iranian centrifuges running on "empty". Suspension, Schulte, explained, "means all enrichment activities to include research and development. We are not looking to parse that in some fashion. We're looking for a full suspension".

Lending a scientific hand to this maximalist US demand, the nuclear scientist David Albright has stated: "Among the proposals and counterproposals seeking a resolution to this issue, one that is especially gaining momentum in some quarters of Europe and Iran is to allow Iran's centrifuges to spin but with no uranium hexafluoride. This would give Iran important knowledge of centrifuge cascade operations with proliferation risks of its own, and must not be part of the negotiated settlement".

Yet, what Albright misses is the reason this option is gaining momentum in Iran and Europe, that is, its feasibility as a viable third option that, as stated by this author in a previous article, can potentially break the present impasse on nuclear talks, since anything beyond that, that is, full suspension, is simply not in the realm of political possibilities in Iran today.

In addition to readily dismissing a viable option increasingly favored by the Europeans, the US diplomacy is suffering from a chronic lack of creativity thinly cloaked by pseudo-solutions aimed at capturing the headlines more than providing substantive grounds for multilateral diplomacy.

In the latest development from Washington the US is about to start negotiations with Moscow for disposing some of its nuclear waste in Russia. Per the reports in both the Washington Post and the New York Times, this deal would be closely linked to Russia's cooperation on Iran. According to the National Security Council spokesman, Frederich L Jones, "we have made clear to Russia that for an agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation to go forward, we will need Russia's active cooperation in blocking Iran's attempt to obtain nuclear weapons".

But, this is clearly a US misstep for three main reasons. First, as the host for the G8 summit, Russia hopes to utilize the opportunity to sell its new image as an energy superpower, not the dumping ground for nuclear wastes by the US and other third countries using US-made power plants, and this can hardly be said to favor Russia's global image.

Second, Russia's growing environmentalist movement is adamantly opposed to President Vladimir Putin's initiative in this regard and, consequently, any such US-Russia deal, is bound to add to Putin's unpopularity at home.

Russia today is already threatened by "widespread contamination of the environment", per a recent report of the environmentalist group, Ekozashachita, which has predicted "minimum profit and maximum radioactive waste", If the deal goes through "each Russian citizen will get an average of 140 grams of nuclear waste and $3.50".

Presently, Russia has 26 nuclear waste sites, many of them causing serious environmental problems. They include the city of Moscow, the Northwest region of Russia, the Kara Sea, the Caspian Sea, the Ural mountains, the Techa River. Even the G8 host city of St Petersburg is put at risk by the train shipments of nuclear waste tunneling through town, per the complaints of Greenpeace activists who cite the numerous problems with Russia's aging and malfunctioning train system, bedeviled by a long list of incidents.

Third, the strong linkage between the nuclear waste deal and Moscow's Iran policy is also bound to backfire with the Russian nationalists surrounding Putin who would be risking his reputation if he consents to this linkage. One thing is certain, precisely because of the US linkage diplomacy, the nuclear waste agreement will likely take longer to ink, perhaps not even during the remainder of Bush's presidency. Much ado about nothing then?

Not necessarily, in light of the rather robust US-Russia cooperation on strategic threat reduction, both sides have agreed to renew until 2013 their historic agreement to cooperate in reducing threats involving their nuclear arsenals. That agreement outweighs other, less important considerations and tensions, between Russia and the US, which is why the Bush administration's explicit linkage of normal nuclear cooperation to Russia's Iran policy is both illogical, untimely and unworkable.

This brings us to the agenda overload of the upcoming G8 summit. With North Korea's missile tests dropping in at center stage, the world leaders, including China's president, attending the summit might end up devoting more attention to North Korea than to Iran.

This, in turn, puts China at center stage, takes some of the heat from Russia, and simultaneously alleviates some of the pressure from Iran that has been somewhat cornered by the mounting pressure to respond to the package. Already, one of Putin's top aides, Sergi Prikhodko, has clarified that Iran will "not be a central international topic" at the summit. Both Prikhodko and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov have kept up hopes that Iran will in the end adopt Russia's proposal for nuclear fuel production for Iran inside Russia, and that is probably one of the strongest common denominators of the White House and Kremlin at the moment.

Everything else has the bittersweet taste of zero-sum diplomacy unlikely to find too many converts either in Tehran, Moscow or elsewhere in Europe.

Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press) and co-authored "Negotiating Iran's Nuclear Populism", The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume X11, issue 2, Summer 2005, with Mustafa Kibaroglu. He also wrote "Keeping Iran's nuclear potential latent", Harvard International Review. He is author of Iran's Nuclear Program: Debating Facts Versus Fiction .

(Copyright 2006 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing .)posted by ali ghannadi-irannuk

world powers refer Iran to Security Council

July 12, 2006.

"nuclear iran"-- World powers agreed Wednesday to send Iran back to the United Nations Security Council for possible punishment, saying the iran has given no sign it means to negotiate seriously over its disputed nuclear program.

The United States and other permanent members of the powerful U.N. body said Iran has had long enough to say whether it will meet the world's terms to open bargaining that would give Tehran economic and energy incentives in exchange for giving up suspicious activities.

"The Iranians have given no indication at all that they are ready to engage seriously on the substance of our proposals," French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy said on behalf the United States, France, Britain, Russia and China, the five permanent Security Council members, plus Germany and the European Union.

Expressing "profound disappointment," the ministers said, "we have no choice but to return to the United Nations Security Council" and resume a course of possible punishment or coercion that the powers had set aside in hopes of reaching a deal.

Any real punishment or coercion at the Security Council is a long way off, but the group said it will seek an initial resolution requiring Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment. Debate could begin as soon as next week.

If Iran does not comply, the group said it would then seek harsher action. The group's short statement did not give any specifics, but it cited a section of the world body's charter that could open the door to economic or other sanctions.

Though Russia and China signed on to Wednesday's statement, the two traditional commercial partners of Iran have previously stated their opposition to imposing the toughest of sanctions on Tehran.
Russia's foreign minister said Wednesday that any forcible sanctions against Iran were out of the question.

"I would like to emphasize that today the Iran-6 members clearly confirmed the previous statements that rule out any possibility of forcible actions against Iran sanctioned by the UN Security Council," Sergei Lavrov said after a Paris meeting of foreign ministers of the five permanent Security Council members and Germany.

"We are convinced that this [forcible] path would not lead us nowhere other than to another crisis in the region," the minister said. "The only way to resolve the Iranian nuclear problem lies through negotiations."
previous to this development,President Vladimir Putin said Wednesday that Sanctions against Iran could wreck the current positive process in the talks on Iran's controversial nuclear program,

"We are not favor of allowing everybody to buy nuclear weapons or delivery vehicles," Putin said in an interview with Canadian television channel CTV. "We are in favor of finding coordinated decisions together, including within the G8. We will be trying to achieve this."

"But if today, without receiving Iran's response to the proposals made by six countries, we impose some kind of sanctions, we will wreck the positive process that has only just emerged," Putin said.

at same time,Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns, the Bush administration's chief negotiator on the Iran issue, said the United States is pleased by what it called strong action by the Security Council group.

"This is a significant decision that frankly reflects the disappointment and frustration of our countries over the lack of a serious response."

The group said it could stop the Security Council actions at any time should Iran cooperate. The U.N.'s nuclear watchdog agency has already told Iran it must put uranium enrichment and related disputed activities on hold, and doing so is the condition for opening negotiations on the incentives package presented to Iran last month.

If Iran agrees to the group's terms for negotiations, it would mean the first high-level face-to-face talks between the United States and Iran after more than a quarter century of estrangement.

Iran ruled out responding this week to international incentives to suspend disputed portions of its nuclear program. The United States and other nations wanted an answer by Wednesday on whether Iran would meet terms to begin negotiations on a package of economic and energy incentives for Iran in exchange for at least the short-term end to Tehran's rapidly advancing program to enrich uranium.

"The indications are that Iran's response has been disappointing and incomplete," Rice had reporters aboard her flight here.

Iran repeatedly has said it will not respond to the offer before August.

The six countries had been pushing for an agreement before world leaders meet this weekend in Russia for the Group of Eight summit of leading industrial democracies.

Enrichment can produce fuel for a civilian reactor or fissile material for a bomb. The U.S. and its allies suspect Iran's nuclear program is cover for a weapons program, despite Tehran's repeated denials.

"If we go to the Security Council we'll take our time in terms of putting together the best response," to make sure Iran understands that it cannot continue to pursue enrichment while talks are ongoing, and that it also understands it can still choose to bargain, Rice said.

The Security Council would also make clear the consequences of rejecting the deal, Rice said.
source"afp,ria novosti
posted by ali ghannadi-irannuk